What follows is a primer we put together to help patients understand this foreseeable and preventable surgical complication. If you or a loved one has suffered post operative visual loss following spine surgery, please contact us at www.girardslaw.com and use the chat feature for more information about how we might be able to help.

Postoperative Visual Loss Following Spinal Surgery: Causes and Mechanisms of Injury

Postoperative visual loss (POVL) is a rare but devastating complication that can occur following spinal surgery, particularly those performed in the prone position. Despite its infrequency, the profound impact on patients’ quality of life makes understanding its causes and mechanisms a critical concern for surgeons, anesthesiologists, and perioperative care teams.

Incidence and Clinical Significance

POVL after spinal surgery is reported with an incidence ranging from 0.013% to 0.2%, with higher rates in extensive or prolonged procedures. The condition can manifest as transient or permanent vision impairment, including complete blindness. Given the elective nature of many spinal surgeries, prevention of POVL is paramount.

Primary Causes of Postoperative Visual Loss

The three most prominent causes of POVL after spinal surgery are ischemic optic neuropathy (ION), central retinal artery occlusion (CRAO), and cortical blindness.

Ischemic Optic Neuropathy

Ischemic optic neuropathy, particularly the posterior form (PION), is the leading cause of POVL in spine surgery. It results from insufficient blood flow to the optic nerve, causing ischemia and subsequent infarction. Two main subtypes exist:

• Anterior ischemic optic neuropathy (AION): Involves the optic nerve head and is often associated with visible optic disc swelling.
• Posterior ischemic optic neuropathy (PION): Affects the retrobulbar portion of the optic nerve, typically without optic disc swelling, making diagnosis more challenging.

Central Retinal Artery Occlusion

CRAO results from obstruction of the central retinal artery, leading to acute retinal ischemia. It is commonly linked to direct external pressure on the globe during surgery, especially when the patient is in the prone position without adequate eye protection or positioning.

Cortical Blindness

This rare form arises from ischemia or infarction of the occipital cortex in the brain, secondary to hypotension or embolic events during surgery. Unlike optic nerve-related causes, pupillary reflexes remain intact, distinguishing cortical blindness clinically.

Mechanisms of Injury

Understanding the mechanisms behind POVL is essential to mitigate risk.

Hypotension and Anemia

Prolonged intraoperative hypotension and significant blood loss leading to anemia can reduce oxygen delivery to the optic nerve. The optic nerve is vulnerable to ischemia due to its limited collateral circulation, especially in PION.

Increased Intraocular Pressure and Venous Congestion

Positioning in the prone posture can increase intraocular pressure (IOP) due to venous congestion, especially if the head is positioned below the heart level or compressed against surgical supports. Increased IOP reduces perfusion pressure in the optic nerve and retina, precipitating ischemic damage.

External Compression

Direct pressure on the eyes from headrests or surgical equipment can occlude the central retinal artery or compress the globe, causing CRAO. Meticulous avoidance of pressure on the eyes during positioning is critical.

Embolic and Vascular Events

Embolism or thrombosis affecting the posterior circulation can cause cortical blindness. Additionally, systemic vascular disease, atherosclerosis, or prolonged hypotension heighten this risk.

Risk Factors

Certain patient and surgical factors increase susceptibility to POVL, including:

• Prolonged surgery duration (>6 hours)
• Large volume blood loss and transfusions
• Prone positioning with improper head support
• Pre-existing vascular disease, hypertension, or diabetes
• Use of vasopressors causing vasoconstriction

Conclusion

POVL following spinal surgery is a complex, multifactorial complication primarily driven by ischemic injury to the optic nerve or retina. Vigilant intraoperative monitoring of hemodynamics, meticulous patient positioning to avoid ocular compression, and minimizing blood loss are crucial strategies to reduce risk. Heightened awareness among surgical teams and prompt recognition can improve outcomes for affected patients.

Continued research into hemodynamic optimization and protective positioning techniques remains essential to further decrease the incidence of this profound complication.

The core dispute centers around over $1 million in court registry funds that were supposed to be disbursed by the district clerk, Marilyn Burgess, to a specific bank account as ordered by the trial court. Instead, due to fraudulent wire instructions allegedly caused by hackers, the funds were wired to an unauthorized account, and ultimately lost after being converted into cryptocurrency. Piney Point Homes, the appellant, sued Burgess in her official capacity for negligence and an ultra vires act (an act beyond legal authority).

The legal questions addressed:

1. Sovereign Immunity
   Burgess asserted sovereign immunity, arguing that she cannot be sued for this loss because the state and its officials enjoy immunity unless the legislature clearly waives it. The court examined Texas statutes that address loss of registry funds (Texas Local Government Code §§ 117.083, 117.124) but found these statutes do not explicitly waive immunity from suit against the clerk. The court held that immunity remains intact unless waived by clear legislative language, which was absent here.

2. Ultra Vires Act Exception
   Piney Point claimed Burgess acted ultra vires by disbursing funds to an account not identified in the court’s order, thus waiving immunity. The court explained that an ultra vires claim requires showing the official acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial duty—something prescribed by law with no room for discretion. 

   The trial court’s order required the district clerk to disburse funds to Robert Berleth’s IOLTA account at Frost Bank, with Berleth providing specific wiring instructions. Berleth provided two subsequent wiring instructions to different accounts, both signed and notarized by him. Burgess followed those instructions after county auditor approval. The court held this complied with the order and statutes. Therefore, Burgess did not act without legal authority, nor did she fail to perform a ministerial act. The court rejected the ultra vires claim.

3. Outcome
   The trial court’s dismissal of Piney Point’s claims against Burgess for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. Sovereign immunity was not waived by the statutes, and Burgess’s actions did not qualify as ultra vires.

In essence, the court protected the district clerk from liability for the loss of registry funds resulting from the fraudulent wire instructions because she acted within the legal framework and authority as dictated by the trial court’s order and the Texas Local Government Code.

Girards Law Firm specializes in severe injury and wrongful death cases, especially those that involve brain damage, heart damage, spinal cord injuries or severe burns in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com by using the chat feature for more information.

Case Overview

Jai Hospitality, LLC owned a motel and had an insurance policy with Western World Insurance Co. The policy was set to expire on June 1, 2020. Days before expiration, Western World’s agent sent a renewal offer—with a premium increase—to Jai’s insurance agent (J. Charles), not directly to Jai. Jai never received direct notice of this offer. A fire occurred on June 26, 2020, and Jai filed a claim, but Western World denied coverage, arguing the policy had expired.

Jai sued, claiming Western World was required—by both the policy and Oklahoma law—to send direct written notice of the renewal (and premium increase) to Jai, and that failing to do so meant the policy was still in effect when the fire happened.

Key Legal Issues

1. Was Western World required to send the renewal offer (with premium increase) directly to Jai, the "first named insured"?
2. Did sending the offer only to Jai’s insurance agent (J. Charles) or the surplus lines broker (All Risks) count as proper notice under Oklahoma law and the contract?
3. If proper notice wasn’t given, did the policy remain in effect at the time of the fire?

What the Lower Courts Did

• Trial Court sided with Western World, ruling that sending the renewal offer to Jai’s agent was enough, and that the policy expired June 1, 2020.
• Court of Civil Appeals affirmed that decision.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Ruling

1. Direct Notice Requirement

The Supreme Court held that both the policy and Oklahoma statute (36 O.S. § 3639(E)) required Western World to send written notice of any renewal with a premium increase directly to Jai, at the address listed in the policy—not just to the agent or broker.

2. Notice to Agent ≠ Notice to Insured

The Court rejected Western World’s argument that notice to Jai’s agent or surplus lines broker was legally sufficient. The plain language of the policy and statute requires direct notice to the insured, and the insurer can’t bypass this by just informing the agent.

3. Effect of Failing to Give Proper Notice

Because Western World failed to give proper notice:

• By the terms of the policy and statute, the existing policy remained in effect until either (a) 45 days after proper notice was finally given, or (b) Jai obtained replacement coverage.
• Since Jai only got replacement coverage in July 2020 (after the fire), the policy was still in effect when the fire occurred.

4. Bad Faith Claim

Because the policy was in effect, Jai’s claim for property damage and for Western World’s alleged bad faith denial could proceed.

Final Result

• The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the lower courts.
• Ruled that Western World should have notified Jai directly of the renewal/premium increase.
• Since it didn’t, coverage was still in effect at the time of the loss.
• Sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings (meaning Jai can pursue its claim and bad faith allegation).

Why This Matters

This case sets a strong precedent in Oklahoma:
Insurers must provide direct written notice to the insured (not just their agent or broker) when renewing a policy with a premium increase. If they don’t, the old policy stays in effect—even if the insured never responds to the agent’s communications.

For policyholders:
If you’re the “first named insured” on a policy, you have the right to get direct notice of changes or nonrenewal. If you don’t, your coverage may continue even if the insurer claims it’s lapsed.

For insurers:
The procedural step of mailing notices to the correct address is not just a formality—it’s the law, and skipping it can keep policies alive longer than intended.

Here’s a clear, plain-English analysis of JAI HOSPITALITY v. WESTERN WORLD INSURANCE CO. (2025 OK 13) based on the full text of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion:

Case Overview

Jai Hospitality, LLC owned a motel and had an insurance policy with Western World Insurance Co. The policy was set to expire on June 1, 2020. Days before expiration, Western World’s agent sent a renewal offer—with a premium increase—to Jai’s insurance agent (J. Charles), not directly to Jai. Jai never received direct notice of this offer. A fire occurred on June 26, 2020, and Jai filed a claim, but Western World denied coverage, arguing the policy had expired.

Jai sued, claiming Western World was required—by both the policy and Oklahoma law—to send direct written notice of the renewal (and premium increase) to Jai, and that failing to do so meant the policy was still in effect when the fire happened.

Key Legal Issues

1. Was Western World required to send the renewal offer (with premium increase) directly to Jai, the "first named insured"?
2. Did sending the offer only to Jai’s insurance agent (J. Charles) or the surplus lines broker (All Risks) count as proper notice under Oklahoma law and the contract?
3. If proper notice wasn’t given, did the policy remain in effect at the time of the fire?

What the Lower Courts Did

• Trial Court sided with Western World, ruling that sending the renewal offer to Jai’s agent was enough, and that the policy expired June 1, 2020.
• Court of Civil Appeals affirmed that decision.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Ruling

1. Direct Notice Requirement

The Supreme Court held that both the policy and Oklahoma statute (36 O.S. § 3639(E)) required Western World to send written notice of any renewal with a premium increase directly to Jai, at the address listed in the policy—not just to the agent or broker.

2. Notice to Agent ≠ Notice to Insured

The Court rejected Western World’s argument that notice to Jai’s agent or surplus lines broker was legally sufficient. The plain language of the policy and statute requires direct notice to the insured, and the insurer can’t bypass this by just informing the agent.

3. Effect of Failing to Give Proper Notice

Because Western World failed to give proper notice:

• By the terms of the policy and statute, the existing policy remained in effect until either (a) 45 days after proper notice was finally given, or (b) Jai obtained replacement coverage.
• Since Jai only got replacement coverage in July 2020 (after the fire), the policy was still in effect when the fire occurred.

4. Bad Faith Claim

Because the policy was in effect, Jai’s claim for property damage and for Western World’s alleged bad faith denial could proceed.

Final Result

• The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the lower courts.
• Ruled that Western World should have notified Jai directly of the renewal/premium increase.
• Since it didn’t, coverage was still in effect at the time of the loss.
• Sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings (meaning Jai can pursue its claim and bad faith allegation).

Why This Matters

This case sets a strong precedent in Oklahoma:
Insurers must provide direct written notice to the insured (not just their agent or broker) when renewing a policy with a premium increase. If they don’t, the old policy stays in effect—even if the insured never responds to the agent’s communications.

For policyholders:
If you’re the “first named insured” on a policy, you have the right to get direct notice of changes or nonrenewal. If you don’t, your coverage may continue even if the insurer claims it’s lapsed.

For insurers:
The procedural step of mailing notices to the correct address is not just a formality—it’s the law, and skipping it can keep policies alive longer than intended.

Girards Law Firm specializes in severe injury and wrongful death cases, especially those that involve brain damage, heart damage, spinal cord injuries or severe burns in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com by using the chat feature for more information

Case Summary

Background:
William D. Lunn, individually and as the representative of his deceased children’s estates, sued Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) for wrongful death after a plane crash. CMI made an unapportioned settlement offer of $300,000 to all plaintiffs, which Lunn rejected. After a jury found for CMI and further appeals, CMI sought to recover attorney’s fees under Oklahoma’s “offer of judgment” statute (12 O.S. § 1101.1(A)), claiming their offer exceeded the judgment amount.

Legal Issue:
Does Oklahoma law allow a defendant to make a single, unapportioned offer of judgment to multiple plaintiffs, or must the offer be divided (“apportioned”) among them?

Court’s Reasoning

1. Statutory Interpretation:
The court closely examined the language of 12 O.S. § 1101.1(A). This statute allows a defendant to make a formal settlement offer to “any plaintiff” and, if rejected, potentially recover legal fees if the final judgment is less than the offer. The court pointed out that the statute uses singular language (“any plaintiff,” “each plaintiff”), suggesting offers must be individualized.

2. Policy and Precedent:
The court cited three prior Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) decisions holding unapportioned offers invalid (Haddock, Medlock, Schommer). These cases found that joint, lump-sum offers create confusion for both courts and plaintiffs:

• Plaintiffs can’t easily assess if a settlement is fair for their individual claims.
• Courts struggle to compare a single offer with multiple verdicts.
• Unapportioned offers risk unfairly shifting attorney’s fees among plaintiffs.

3. Practical Problems:
The court emphasized the need for clarity: If an offer isn’t split up, it’s unclear what amount should be compared to each plaintiff’s eventual judgment. This uncertainty undermines the statute’s purpose (encouraging settlements and discouraging unnecessary litigation).

4. Bright-Line Rule:
The court adopted a “bright-line” rule: In multi-plaintiff cases, an offer of judgment must be apportioned so each plaintiff knows the proposed amount for their claim.

Holding

• An unapportioned offer of judgment (a single dollar amount to all plaintiffs together) is invalid under Oklahoma law.
• Offers must state how much each plaintiff would receive.
• The district court was correct to deny CMI’s request for attorney’s fees based on an unapportioned offer.

Implications

• For lawyers: When making an offer of judgment in Oklahoma to multiple plaintiffs, always specify how much is allocated to each. Failure to do so means you can’t recover attorney’s fees if the offer is rejected and the final judgment is less.
• For plaintiffs: You have more protection against ambiguous settlement offers and can independently assess and accept offers.
• For courts: This rule simplifies post-trial comparisons and reduces disputes over settlements and fees.

Girards Law Firm specializes in severe injury and wrongful death cases, especially those that involve brain damage, heart damage, spinal cord injuries or severe burns in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com by using the chat feature for more information

Background

• Who sued whom?
  Clayton Franklin, as administrator for his son Cody’s estate, sued the City of Ozark, Officer Nathan Griffith, and Sergeant Joseph Griffith after Cody died in jail custody. The claim was for wrongful death, alleging excessive force and failure to provide medical care.

• What happened?
  Cody Franklin was acting erratically and arrested in May 2016. He fought with jail staff, was repeatedly tased by officers, and died soon after. The medical examiner said he died from a combination of meth intoxication, physical struggle, restraint, and taser use.

• What’s the legal history?
  The case started in federal court with both federal and state law claims. The Eighth Circuit ruled the officers’ force wasn’t excessive under federal law, so they had “qualified immunity” on the civil rights claims. The state law claims were dismissed without prejudice (meaning they could be refiled in state court), which Franklin then did.

The Legal Issues on Appeal

1. Statute of Limitations:
   Did Franklin file the wrongful death suit too late?

2. Immunity:
   Are the City and the officers immune from the wrongful death lawsuit under Arkansas law?

The Court of Appeals focused on the second issue—immunity.

The Court’s Analysis

Statutory Immunity in Arkansas

• Arkansas law (Ark. Code. Ann. § 21-9-301) gives cities, counties, and their employees immunity from lawsuits for damages “except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance.” 
• This immunity applies to claims of negligence—including gross negligence or “willful and wanton” negligence—but not to intentional torts (like assault or battery, if they are truly intentional).

What Did Franklin Allege?

Franklin’s amended complaint claimed “willful and wanton” misconduct by the officers but did not allege specific intentional acts (like deliberately trying to harm Cody with the desire to cause his death).

Did That Matter?

Yes. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that “willful and wanton misconduct” is just a high degree of negligence, not an intentional tort. So, unless Franklin alleged the officers deliberately tried to harm Cody—and wanted that harm to happen—the City and officers are immune.

Did the City Have Insurance?

No. The mayor swore there was no insurance that would cover this incident, so no exception to immunity applied.

The Result

• The circuit court (trial court) dismissed Franklin’s case, saying the City and officers were immune.
• The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the dismissal.
• Because the immunity issue was conclusive, they didn’t even need to rule on whether the case was filed on time.

Why This Matters

• For lawsuits against Arkansas cities and officers, it’s not enough to allege “willful and wanton” or even grossly negligent conduct. You have to allege (and prove) truly intentional acts if you want to get around governmental immunity.
• If the city doesn’t have insurance that covers the claim, you’re out of luck unless you can show intentional wrongdoing.

Key Takeaways

• “Willful and wanton” = heightened negligence, but still not enough to defeat immunity.
• Actual, deliberate intent to harm is required to get around Arkansas’s statutory immunity for municipalities and their employees.
• If there’s no insurance, immunity almost always applies unless you’ve got a clear intentional tort.

Girards Law Firm specializes in severe injury and wrongful death cases, especially those that involve brain damage, heart damage, spinal cord injuries or severe burns in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com by using the chat feature for more information.

Background

A group of property owners and the Pinnacle Mountain Community Coalition (“the Coalition”) filed a lawsuit against Rick Ferguson and associated entities (“the Ferguson Appellees”). The dispute centered on the development of the Paradise Valley subdivision in Roland, Arkansas. The Coalition alleged that the development caused increased stormwater runoff, resulting in flooding of their properties and a local county road (Roland Cut Off Road), and posed a threat to local watersheds supplying drinking water.

The Coalition sought an injunction to halt the development, citing public and private nuisance, diversion of water, and negligence.

Procedural History

• The Ferguson Appellees (and Pulaski County) moved to dismiss, arguing the case belonged in county court, not circuit court, under Article 7, Section 28 of the Arkansas Constitution, since it allegedly involved county roads.
• The circuit court agreed, dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and transferred the case to Pulaski County Court.
• The Coalition appealed.

Issues on Appeal

1. Did the circuit court err in finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under Article 7, Section 28?
2. Did the court err by transferring the case to county court?

Court's Analysis

• Jurisdiction Interpretation: Article 7, Section 28 gives county courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to county “taxes, roads, bridges, ferries,” and other local concerns. But the court clarified that “relating to” does not mean every case that touches a county issue must be handled by county court.
• Nature of the Claims: The court found the Coalition’s complaint was not “obviously flowing from” a county road matter. Instead, the claims were based on alleged damage to private property, with flooding of the road as a secondary effect.
• Remedy Sought: The Coalition sought an injunction, which is a remedy handled by circuit courts, not county courts.
• Precedent: The court cited prior cases confirming that circuit courts have jurisdiction over injunctions and property disputes, even if a county road is incidentally involved.

Holding

• The circuit court abused its discretion by dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Circuit court is the proper forum for these claims.
• The issue of transferring to county court became moot.

Result: The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Key Takeaways

• Jurisdiction hinges on the primary nature of the complaint and the remedy sought, not just incidental involvement of a county road.
• Circuit courts retain jurisdiction over injunctions and property disputes, even if county-related issues are implicated.
• The court will look at the facts alleged in the complaint, not just procedural arguments, when determining jurisdiction.

Girards Law Firm specializes in severe injury and wrongful death cases, especially those that involve brain damage, heart damage, spinal cord injuries or severe burns in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com by using the chat feature for more information.

Case Overview

• Appellant: University Medical Pharmaceuticals Corp.
• Appellee: Team Direct Management, LLC
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
• Citation: 2025 Ark. App. 297
• Appeal From: Benton County Circuit Court
• Judge: Hon. Christine Horwart

Core Facts

• Team Direct sued University Medical in 2021 with three claims: 

  1. Breach of written contract 
  2. Promissory estoppel 
  3. Unjust enrichment

• Before trial, Team Direct voluntarily dismissed the breach of contract claim (without prejudice).

• At a bench trial, the court ruled in Team Direct’s favor for unjust enrichment and awarded $460,837.02.

• University Medical appealed this judgment.

Key Legal Issue

Was there a “final order” that could be appealed?

• Arkansas law requires that an order must resolve all claims and parties (or have a special certification) to be considered final for appeal.
• Here, the breach of contract claim was dismissed without prejudice, so it could be refiled. The promissory estoppel claim was not addressed in the court’s final order.

Court’s Ruling

• The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without prejudice. 
• They held that, because not all claims were resolved (promissory estoppel was left open and breach of contract could be refiled), the order was not truly “final.”
• No Rule 54(b) certificate was issued to make the partial judgment appealable.
• The appellate court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Key Takeaways and Implications

• Finality is crucial: Parties can’t appeal unless every claim is resolved or the court certifies the order as final under Rule 54(b).
• Voluntary nonsuit (dismissal without prejudice) does not create finality: The ability to refile means the claim is not truly over.
• Unresolved claims block appeals: If any claim (like promissory estoppel here) is unaddressed, there’s no appealable order.
• Practical effect: The trial court’s judgment stands, but a proper final order must be entered (addressing all claims or dismissing them with prejudice, or with a Rule 54(b) certificate) before an appeal can proceed.

Girards Law Firm specializes in severe injury and wrongful death cases, especially those that involve brain damage, heart damage, spinal cord injuries or severe burns in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com by using the chat feature for more information.

Case Summary

Facts:

• Boyle Ventures, which operates franchised pet stores selling cats and dogs from USDA-regulated breeders, got a business license to open in Fayetteville, Arkansas.
• Before Boyle opened, the city passed Ordinance No. 6587, banning pet stores from selling cats or dogs unless sourced from government/nonprofit shelters or rescues approved by Fayetteville Animal Services.
• Boyle sued, claiming the ordinance violated two Arkansas state statutes:
  • The Retail Pet Store Consumer Protection Act (requiring guarantees and records for pet purchasers)
  • The Working Animal Protection Act (limiting municipal power to ban animal businesses)
• Boyle sought a declaration that the ordinance was invalid, an injunction to block enforcement, and damages under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA).
• The city and Boyle agreed to a temporary restraining order, so the ordinance was never enforced against Boyle.
• The city then repealed the ordinance before Boyle opened or was affected by it.

Procedural History:

• The lower court found the ordinance conflicted with state law but ruled the city was immune from damages ("qualified immunity").
• Both sides appealed: Boyle wanted damages; the city wanted a finding that there was no violation.

Key Legal Issues

1. Did the Fayetteville ordinance violate Arkansas statutes or the state constitution?
2. Can Boyle get damages under the ACRA if the ordinance was never enforced and Boyle suffered no actual harm?
3. Is the case moot since the ordinance was repealed and never took effect against Boyle?
4. Was the city entitled to immunity?

Arkansas Supreme Court's Reasoning

1. No Actual Harm = No Case

• The court said that because the ordinance never went into effect against Boyle (thanks to the restraining order and later repeal), Boyle suffered no deprivation of rights and had no damages.
• Without actual harm, there's no basis for a claim under the ACRA, which requires someone to be deprived of a constitutional right.

2. Statutes Interpreted: No Conflict

• The majority found that the ordinance did not conflict with the Retail Pet Store Act or the Working Animal Protection Act:
  • The Retail Pet Store Act, as written at the time, did not prevent local laws like this ordinance.
  • The Working Animal Protection Act, based on legislative history, was designed to protect enterprises using “working animals” (like horse shows, dog shows, hunting) — not pet stores selling cats and dogs.
• Thus, even if the ordinance had taken effect, it wouldn’t violate those state laws.

3. Mootness

• Because the ordinance was repealed before it affected Boyle, the court found the case was moot (“no live controversy”).
• The court dismissed Boyle’s direct appeal as moot and reversed the lower court’s finding that the ordinance violated state law.

4. Immunity Arguments

• There was debate among the justices about whether statutory immunity (i.e., legal protection from lawsuits) for the city should be treated as an “affirmative defense” or a jurisdictional bar.
• The majority said the mootness of the case made the immunity issue irrelevant.

Key Takeaways

• No Harm, No Foul: Courts require actual injury to award damages. If a law is never enforced and is repealed before it impacts anyone, there’s no standing to sue for damages.
• Preemption Arguments: Local ordinances are not necessarily preempted by state law unless the statute expressly says so or the local law directly conflicts with state law’s purpose.
• Statutory Interpretation: Legislative intent matters. Here, the Working Animal Protection Act was aimed at protecting “working animal” enterprises, not retail pet stores.
• Mootness Doctrine: Courts won’t decide abstract or hypothetical disputes—if the controversy ends (here, by repeal of the ordinance), the case is dismissed.
• Immunity Issues: The case highlights ongoing legal debates about how and when government entities can be sued, but those debates don’t matter if there’s no live controversy.

Bottom Line

This case reinforces the principle that a business can't claim damages for a law that never actually harmed it, especially if the law is repealed before taking effect. The court also clarified that Arkansas’s animal welfare statutes, as they stood at the time, didn’t prevent local governments from passing stricter regulations on pet sales—unless the legislature specifically says otherwise.

Girards Law Firm specializes in severe injury and wrongful death cases, especially those that involve brain damage, heart damage, spinal cord injuries or severe burns in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com by using the chat feature for more information.

The case involves detainees from Venezuela, alleged members of the terrorist group Tren de Aragua (TdA), who face removal under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). The detainees sought injunctions to prevent their summary removal, asserting they were not given constitutionally adequate notice or due process before removal.

The Supreme Court granted a temporary injunction preventing removal pending further proceedings, vacated the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case for further consideration of due process notice requirements and the merits of removal authority under the AEA.

Key points:

• The Court found the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' interlocutory appeal, reasoning that the district court's delay had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief despite the urgency of imminent removals.

• The Court stressed that the Fifth Amendment guarantees due process rights to aliens subject to removal, including timely and meaningful notice sufficient to allow detainees to seek habeas relief before removal.

• The Court declined to resolve the ultimate legality of removals under the AEA or precise due process requirements itself, instead remanding those issues to the lower courts for expedited resolution.

• The Court allowed classwide injunctive relief to preserve jurisdiction, despite the district court denying class certification on the underlying habeas claims. The Court reasoned that temporary relief on notice rights for a putative class was appropriate pending further proceedings.

• Justice Kavanaugh concurred, emphasizing the importance of prompt Supreme Court resolution of the underlying legal questions.

• Justice Alito dissented, arguing no jurisdiction existed to grant relief, that the district court had not constructively denied injunction, and that classwide relief was improper in habeas proceedings. He criticized the Court's procedural approach as unprecedented and overreaching.

The case highlights tensions between executive national security actions and constitutional protections for detainees facing removal, especially under the rarely used Alien Enemies Act. It underscores the Court's role in ensuring due process rights even where urgent removal is involved, while leaving detailed procedural and substantive questions to lower courts for further development.

Girards Law Firm specializes in cases involving severe injuries and wrongful death, especially those that involve brain injury, spinal cord injuries or severe burns. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com using the chat feature on our website for more information.

Case Overview

• Court: Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas
• Case Title: In re Stillwater Capital Investments, LLC, et al.
• Date: May 15, 2025
• Type: Original proceeding (writ of mandamus)

What Happened?

1. Litigation Begins: The underlying lawsuit started in a Texas district court, presided over by a judge who later moved to a different court (the 162nd District Court).
2. Judge’s Actions: While assigned, this judge made several rulings—on things like discovery, scheduling, evidence, and summary judgment.
3. Judge Recuses Herself: On the first day of trial, the judge orally recused herself (i.e., stepped down from the case) and later signed a formal recusal order.
4. Case Transferred: The Presiding Judge (who oversees administrative matters for the region) transferred the case to a new court.
5. Judge’s Term Ends: The original judge’s term expired at the end of 2024.

The Parties’ Complaint

• Relators (Stillwater, et al.): After the judge recused herself and after the transfer, they filed a motion to have the judge disqualified (which is a higher bar than recusal) and to void all her prior orders.
• Their Argument: They believed the judge should be declared disqualified, not just recused, and that all her rulings (and those by an associate judge she appointed) should be wiped out.
• They also wanted: A hearing on their motion, as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a.

What Did the Presiding Judge Do?

• Denied the Motions: The Presiding Judge denied the relators’ motion to disqualify and their request for a hearing, calling the issue “moot” (because the judge had already recused and her term was over).
• Second Motion: Relators tried again, filing an amended motion for an evidentiary hearing. The Presiding Judge again denied it before any hearing took place.

The Appeal (Mandamus)

• Mandamus Petition: Relators asked the Court of Appeals to force the Presiding Judge to (a) declare the judge disqualified and void all her orders, or (b) at least hold a hearing.

The Court of Appeals’ Reasoning

• Rule 18a’s Purpose: This rule lets parties ask to recuse or disqualify a sitting judge to ensure fairness. But here, by the time the relators asked for disqualification, the judge had already recused herself and was no longer involved.
• No Need for Hearing: Since the judge was already gone, there was nothing left for the Presiding Judge to do—no relief to grant under Rule 18a.
• Disqualification vs. Recusal: Disqualification is more serious (and voids all orders), but relators waited until after the judge recused and her term expired to raise the issue.
• Who Decides If Orders Are Void?: The trial court (now the 193rd District Court) can decide if the previous orders are void due to disqualification. The Presiding Judge is not the right forum.
• Mandamus Standard: To get mandamus relief, you must show the judge clearly abused their discretion and you have no other remedy. Here, relators can still raise their arguments with the trial court.

The Bottom Line

• Mandamus Denied: The Court of Appeals refused to grant the writ. The relators did not show the Presiding Judge abused discretion in denying the hearings or their motions.
• What’s Next?: If relators still want to challenge the former judge’s rulings as void, they need to do that in the new trial court.

Summary The court said: You waited too long to challenge the judge. She was already gone, so the Presiding Judge didn’t need to hold a hearing or declare her disqualified. If you think her rulings are void, take it up with the current trial court—not us.

Girards Law Firm specializes in cases involving severe injury or wrongful death especially cases involving brain injuries, spinal cord injuries, and severe burns. Contact us through our Chat feature at www.girardslaw.com for more information

Maryam Mohammadi slipped and fell at a Randall’s grocery store, allegedly because a puddle formed next to a shopping cart with leaking items. She sued Randall’s claiming they failed to warn about the wet floor. 

The jury found no liability under the “constructive knowledge” standard — meaning they decided Randall’s did not reasonably should have known about the danger. Because the jury answered that way, they were not asked to consider liability under the “actual knowledge” standard — whether Randall’s actually knew about the wet floor.

The Court of Appeals reversed that decision, saying the jury should have been allowed to consider liability under actual knowledge even if the constructive knowledge claim failed. They relied on a precedent case (Corbin v. Safeway) which allowed actual knowledge to be inferred from an antecedent condition (like a leaking bag in the cart).

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. They said even if there was an error in not letting the jury consider actual knowledge, it was harmless because there was no evidence Randall’s actually knew about the wet floor. The wet floor itself, not the leaking bag (the antecedent condition), is what matters for actual knowledge in premises liability.

The Court emphasized that knowing about a condition that might lead to a hazard (like a leaking bag) is not the same as knowing about the hazard itself (the wet floor). Since no evidence showed Randall’s employees saw or knew of the wet floor before Mohammadi fell, no reasonable jury could have found actual knowledge.

So, the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s verdict in favor of Randall’s, ending Mohammadi’s claim.

In other words, the key legal takeaway is that in premises liability cases, actual knowledge must be about the dangerous condition itself at the time of injury — not just about something that might cause it. And if the jury properly found no constructive knowledge, lack of actual knowledge evidence means the verdict for the store stands.

Girards Law Firm specializes in severe injury and death cases in Texas, Arkansas & Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com and use the Chat feature for more information.

1. Legal Question at Issue:

The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus for foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay who had been designated as enemy combatants. Essentially, did Congress have the power to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions from these detainees? This involved considering the scope of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, Clause 2), which states that "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

2. Court's Holding:

The Supreme Court held that Section 7 of the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court ruled that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay did have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, and that the procedures established by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) were not an adequate substitute for habeas review. Therefore, the federal courts did have jurisdiction to hear the detainees' habeas petitions.

3. Reasoning Behind the Opinion:

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned as follows:

• The Importance of Habeas Corpus: The Court emphasized the historical importance of the writ of habeas corpus as a fundamental safeguard of individual liberty and a critical mechanism for maintaining the separation of powers. The Suspension Clause was designed to protect against abuses of power by the executive and legislative branches.
• Extraterritoriality and the Suspension Clause: The Court rejected the government's argument that the Suspension Clause did not apply to Guantanamo Bay because the United States did not have formal sovereignty over the base. The Court reasoned that the reach of the Suspension Clause turned on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalistic notions of sovereignty. They considered the detainees' status, the nature of the site of detention, and the practical obstacles to granting the writ.
• Inadequacy of the DTA Review Process: The Court found that the DTA's procedures for reviewing detainees' status were not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus because they were too limited. Detainees had limited ability to challenge the factual basis for their detention, to present exculpatory evidence, or to challenge the President's authority to detain them indefinitely. The Court emphasized that a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that one is being held unlawfully is essential to habeas review.

4. Summary of Chief Justice Roberts' Dissent:

Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the majority's decision was a dramatic departure from precedent and would have serious consequences for national security. He made the following key points:

• Premature Ruling: Roberts believed the Court should have allowed the D.C. Circuit to determine whether the procedures set forth in the DTA were an adequate substitute for habeas review.
• Respect for Political Branches: The dissent emphasized the need for deference to the political branches (the President and Congress) in matters of national security. Roberts argued that the Court was overstepping its role by second-guessing the decisions of the other branches.
• Practical Concerns: Roberts raised concerns about the practical difficulties of holding habeas hearings for detainees at Guantanamo Bay and the potential for these proceedings to disrupt military operations and expose classified information.
• Eisentrager Precedent: Roberts argued that the majority was wrongly interpreting the Supreme Court's prior decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950), which had held that enemy aliens detained outside the United States had no right to habeas corpus. He believed that Eisentrager supported the government's argument that the Suspension Clause did not apply to the Guantanamo detainees.

In essence, Roberts' dissent argued that the majority's decision was an unwarranted intrusion into the realm of national security and would create significant practical problems without providing any meaningful benefit to the detainees.

Girards Law Firm pursues cases involving severe injury or wrongful death in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com and use the Chat feature to arrange for a free consultation.

In the United States, foreign gifts to United States Presidents are governed by 10 CFR part 1050 "Foreign Gifts and Decorations." You can review the text of these regulations by clicking here.

The summary of the regulations is that a foreign gift of value greater than $350 are received by the White House Gifts Unit and then transferred to the National Archives Records Administration for long-term storage or display at Presidential Libraries.  The National Archives Foundation has a helpful summary of the process available for review by clicking here.

So, now you know....

Girards Law Firm helps families who have suffered severe injury or wrongful death of a loved one in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Contact us at www.girardslaw.com for a free consultation.

Girards Law Firm represents families damaged by Severe Injuries or Wrongful Death in Texas, Oklahoma and Arkansas. Contact us for a free consultation at www.girardslaw.com 

Eric Iverson, a U.S. citizen and Army veteran serving as lead prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Darfur-related cases, is suing President Donald J. Trump (and others in their official capacities) over Executive Order 14203. This executive order imposes sanctions on the ICC and its personnel—including the Prosecutor, Karim Khan—stemming from concerns that the ICC might investigate U.S. nationals or those of allied countries.

Key claims in the complaint:

1. First Amendment Violation:
   Iverson argues the executive order unlawfully restricts his ability to practice law, communicate, and advocate as required by his job at the ICC, chilling his protected speech and professional legal activities—even though his work does not involve “protected persons” (U.S. nationals or nationals of allies). He claims the order is overbroad, content-based, and viewpoint-discriminatory.

2. Exceeding Statutory Authority (Ultra Vires):
   The complaint alleges that EO 14203 exceeds the President’s statutory powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Specifically, it forbids the President from using these powers to regulate or prohibit the import/export of “information or informational materials”—which includes legal filings and evidence sharing essential to Iverson’s job.

3. No “Unusual and Extraordinary Threat”:
   Iverson claims the executive order does not address a genuinely “unusual and extraordinary threat,” as legally required to invoke IEEPA. He points out that Congress has already legislated how to handle the risk of U.S. nationals being prosecuted by the ICC, and has declined to impose such sanctions itself. He argues that the executive order undermines Congress’s careful legislative balance.

4. Direct Professional Harm:
   Because the ICC Prosecutor is now a sanctioned “Specially Designated National” (SDN), Iverson says he risks severe civil and criminal penalties if he continues his work—despite his activities being unrelated to any U.S. or allied nationals. The order has already forced him to stop supervising investigations and carrying out his core duties, harming Darfur-related justice efforts.

What Iverson is asking the court to do:

• Declare EO 14203 unconstitutional and void.
• Enjoin (block) any enforcement of the executive order against him for his ICC work.
• Prevent civil or criminal penalties related to his professional activities in Darfur cases.
• Award costs and attorneys’ fees.

In short:
Iverson is challenging sanctions that, he says, block him from doing his job at the ICC (with U.S. government support) and violate his constitutional and statutory rights, even though his work has nothing to do with U.S. or allied nationals.

Girards Law Firm specializes in cases involving Severe Injury or Wrongful Death in Texas, Oklahoma and Arkansas. Please use the Chat feature on www.girardslaw.com if you would like us to consider your potential legal claims.

Case: Robbin Nelson v. Houston Methodist Sugar Land Hospital
Court: Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Texas
Date: May 8, 2025
Type: Premises Liability (Slip and Fall in Parking Lot)
Result: Jury verdict for Nelson reversed; judgment for Hospital affirmed on appeal.

Background

Robbin Nelson sued Houston Methodist Sugar Land Hospital after she fell in the hospital’s parking lot. Her heel got caught in a small divot (“pothole”) in the concrete, causing her to fall and injure herself. Her husband took photos of the spot afterward. The defect was described as “spalling”—a common wear-and-tear issue in pavement.

• Nelson said she didn’t see the divot before falling.
• The hospital’s staff and expert said the defect was less than an inch deep and “not a very deep mark,” and that such spalling was common.
• The area had not caused prior incidents or complaints.

Trial Outcome

• Jury: Found both Nelson and the hospital negligent, split fault 50/50, and awarded Nelson $197,500.
• Judge: Overruled the jury (judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or JNOV), finding the defect was not “unreasonably dangerous” as a matter of law. Nelson received nothing.

Key Legal Issue

Was the concrete divot an “unreasonably dangerous condition” under Texas law?

• To win as a licensee (someone on the property with permission but not for business), Nelson had to prove:
  1. The condition posed unreasonable risk.
  2. The owner knew about it.
  3. Nelson didn’t know about it.
  4. The owner failed to warn or fix it.
  5. The failure caused her injury.

The appeal focused on the first point: whether the divot was unreasonably dangerous.

Court’s Reasoning

• The court compared this case to United Supermarkets, LLC v. McIntire (Texas Supreme Court, 2022), where a similar parking lot divot was ruled not unreasonably dangerous.
• Factors considered:
  • Was the condition marked or obvious? (Here, it was out in the open.)
  • Its size and depth? (Less than an inch.)
  • Prior complaints or injuries? (None.)
  • Was it unique or common? (Common in parking lots.)
  • Was it naturally occurring? (Yes, from wear and tear.)

The court said “tiny surface defects in pavement are ubiquitous and naturally occurring,” and it is unreasonable to expect property owners to fix every small imperfection. The divot here was “profoundly ordinary”—not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law.

Even though Nelson was injured, that alone doesn’t make the hazard legally “unreasonable.” There was no evidence of other incidents or unusual danger.

Conclusion

• The trial court was right to throw out the jury’s verdict.
• The divot did not qualify as an unreasonably dangerous condition under Texas law.
• Nelson loses the case; the hospital wins.

Takeaway:
To win a slip-and-fall case in Texas, the hazard must be more than a common, minor surface flaw. Even injuries alone aren’t enough—there must be evidence that the condition was unusually risky or had caused prior problems.

Girards Law Firm specializes in Severe Injury and Wrongful Death cases in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Please use the Chat feature at www.GirardsLaw.com if you would like to contact us about legal representation. 

Case Background

• Parties:

  • Plaintiff/Appellee: David Saxon Bagley, individually and as the representative of his son, Jeremiah Ray Bagley’s estate 
  • Defendants/Appellants: Ramona Rogers, M.D., several Rio Grande State Center (RGSC) employees (psychiatric nurse assistants, supervisors, and another physician), all sued after Jeremiah’s death while in state mental health custody

• Facts:

  • Jeremiah, diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, was involuntarily committed to RGSC after an arrest.
  • He got into altercations with other patients, leading staff to assign him one-to-one supervision.
  • After he struck his monitor, five nurse assistants restrained him and gave him sedative/antipsychotic injections.
  • He calmed down, but soon after, he became agitated, went into cardiac arrest, and died.
  • Autopsy: Multiple injuries (fractured vertebrae, cracked ribs, lacerated spleen, contusions), cause of death listed as "excited delirium due to psychosis with restraint-associated blunt force trauma."

• The Lawsuit:

  • Bagley sued under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983), alleging excessive force, deliberate indifference in training/supervision, and deliberate indifference to medical needs.
  • Texas’s Medical Liability Act (TMLA) requires a plaintiff to provide an expert medical report to proceed with a health care liability claim (HCLC).

Legal Arguments

• Defendants’ Position:

  • Said Bagley’s claims were health care liability claims and didn’t meet TMLA’s expert report requirements.
  • Objected to Bagley’s expert reports, saying:
    • Some experts (like the behavioral analyst and OIG investigator) weren’t physicians, so they couldn’t opine on medical causation.
    • The psychiatrist’s (Dr. Calvert) report didn’t show she was qualified to opine on the physical causation of death.
    • Reports lacked details on what the standard of care was, how it was breached, and how that breach caused death.

• Plaintiff’s Position:

  • Argued that § 74.351 (expert report requirement) didn’t apply, since his claims were for excessive force under federal law — not just typical medical negligence.

What Happened in the Courts

• Trial Court: Denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss; said the claims could proceed.
• First Appeal: The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, holding that federal law preempted the TMLA requirements.
• Texas Supreme Court: Reversed. Held that the TMLA expert report requirement is a procedural rule and not preempted by federal law, so it applies to claims even if they’re framed under federal law.

This Appeal’s Holding

• Key Issues: Did Bagley’s expert reports meet the TMLA’s requirements?

• Court’s Reasoning:

  • Causation:
    • Only a qualified physician can opine on medical causation.
    • The behavioral analyst and OIG investigator were unqualified.
    • The psychiatrist’s report (Dr. Calvert) showed experience in mental health but not in the physical mechanics of restraint or trauma; her CV/report didn’t establish she was qualified to opine on those issues.
    • The autopsy report didn’t link conduct to causation.
    • Result: Reports were deficient on causation.
  • Standard of Care/Breach:
    • Reports didn’t adequately identify the specific standard of care, how it was breached, or what each defendant should have done differently.
    • Dr. Calvert’s report, while from a psychiatrist, didn’t show she was qualified to opine on the proper physical restraint of psychiatric patients or the training/supervision of staff.
    • Similar problems for the supervisors and nurse assistants — the experts lacked specific qualifications, and their reports were conclusory.
    • Result: Reports were deficient on the standard of care and breach.

• Conclusion:

  • The trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss, but the law allows the plaintiff a 30-day extension to try to fix the expert reports.
  • The case is sent back to the trial court to decide whether Bagley can cure the deficiencies within that time.

Bottom Line

• The expert reports were not good enough under Texas medical liability law (not enough detail on qualifications, causation, or breach).
• The case isn’t over — Bagley gets a chance to fix the reports.
• The key legal point: Even claims framed under federal law for excessive force in a healthcare setting must meet Texas’s medical liability procedural expert requirements.

Girards Law Firm specializes in cases involving Severe Injury or Wrongful Death in Texas, Oklahoma and Arkansas. Please use the Chat feature at www.girardslaw.com to submit your information if you would like to consider allowing us to assist you in such a case.  

Case Summary

Vanessa Lucio sued Covenant Health System, Methodist Hospital (Plainview, Texas), and two doctors for medical malpractice. At trial, the jury found that the defendants’ negligence did not cause Lucio’s injuries. Based on that, the judge entered a “take nothing” judgment—Lucio got no compensation. Lucio appealed, arguing the trial court made a mistake by not removing two jurors (Jurors 25 and 27) for cause, both of whom ended up on the jury.

Key Issues on Appeal

Lucio said the trial court should have removed Jurors 25 and 27 because:

• Juror 27: Allegedly showed bias by saying she’d demand more than a “preponderance of the evidence” (the civil standard) to award “millions of dollars.”
• Juror 25: Similarly expressed this attitude, and also had a work connection to the defendant hospital (her employer received referrals from Covenant Hospital), which Lucio argued created a disqualifying financial interest.

Legal Analysis by the Court

Preservation of Error

First, the court checked whether Lucio properly preserved her objection for appeal. Under Texas law, to preserve this kind of issue, you have to:

1. Use a peremptory strike on the juror.
2. Use up all your other strikes.
3. Tell the court a specific, objectionable juror will stay on the jury.

The court found Lucio did all this, so her complaint was properly preserved.

Juror 27 – Bias Over Damages

• During jury selection, Lucio’s lawyer asked if anyone would require more proof than “the greater weight of the evidence” (preponderance) to award millions. Juror 27 raised her hand.
• Lucio’s lawyer followed up only with Juror 15 (not 27), and didn’t ask Juror 27 directly about her reasoning.
• Defense counsel did question Juror 27. She said she understood the burden of proof and had no problem sitting on the jury.

The court’s reasoning:

• Raising a hand in a group doesn’t prove unequivocal bias.
• The law says a juror is disqualified only if their state of mind clearly shows they can’t be fair.
• Since Lucio’s lawyer didn’t follow up with Juror 27 and she later said she could follow the law, her supposed bias was not established as a matter of law.
• The trial court, being there in person, is in the best position to judge sincerity.

Result: Trial court did not abuse its discretion in keeping Juror 27.

Juror 25 – Bias and Financial Interest

• Juror 25 also raised her hand about requiring more proof for big damages, but Lucio’s lawyer didn’t question her further.
• Defense counsel did ask: Could she follow the court’s instructions and base her decision on the evidence? She said yes.
• Juror 25 worked for Calvert Home Health, which got referrals from Covenant Hospital. She worried her boss might not like her ruling against Covenant but wasn’t sure if that would affect her.

On bias:

• Since she said she could follow the law and the evidence, and the questioning was limited, the court found no unequivocal bias.

On financial interest:

• Lucio didn’t specifically argue “financial interest” as a ground for removal at trial—only later on appeal.
• Even if she had, the connection was too remote and speculative: It depended on the hospital withholding business from her employer and her employer punishing her for her vote. That’s not enough for disqualification.

Bottom Line

The appeals court found:

• Lucio did preserve her complaints for review.
• But the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenges for cause for either juror.
• Juror 25’s work connection wasn’t enough to disqualify her.

The verdict stands and Lucio’s appeal is denied.

Key Takeaways

• Raising a hand in voir dire (jury selection) is not, by itself, proof of bias.
• Follow-up questioning is crucial if you want to show a juror can’t be fair.
• A remote or speculative financial connection to a party is not enough to disqualify a juror in Texas.
• Appellate courts defer heavily to the trial judge’s discretion in these matters.

Girards Law Firm pursues cases involving severe injury or wrongful death in Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma. Please use our Chat feature at www.girardslaw.com if you'd like us to review your potential claim.

Case Background

Nicole Tarpley sued Red Bluff, LLC (her employer, a nonsubscriber to Texas workers’ compensation) for injuries suffered while working as a certified nursing assistant. A jury found in Tarpley’s favor, and the trial court awarded her $7.1 million on claims for negligence and premises liability.

Red Bluff’s lead counsel missed the standard 30-day window for post-judgment motions, claiming he didn’t actually see or read the email notice of judgment until March 14—well after the judgment was signed (Feb 4) and the clerk’s email was sent (Feb 8). He filed his notice of appeal and relevant post-judgment motions on March 14, along with a sworn statement that he wasn’t aware of the judgment until that day.

The trial court and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals both found that Red Bluff’s counsel had “actual knowledge” of the judgment on Feb 8—the day the clerk emailed the notice—and thus was not entitled to a deadline extension. Red Bluff appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.

Core Legal Issue

Does an attorney have “actual knowledge” of a judgment merely because the court clerk emailed the notice—even if the attorney never actually read or saw that email? Or, does “actual knowledge” require subjective, real awareness?

At the time, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(3) required notice to be sent by first-class mail, not email. Rule 306a(4) allows for a post-judgment deadline extension if the party shows (1) they didn’t receive the required notice and (2) didn’t actually know about the judgment within 20 days of its signing.

Supreme Court’s Analysis

• Notice by Mail Requirement: The court found Red Bluff didn’t receive notice via first-class mail as required, satisfying the first prong for a deadline extension.
• Actual Knowledge Definition: The Court emphasized that “actual knowledge” means subjective awareness—one must “in fact be aware” of the information. Constructive knowledge (what one should have known if diligent) isn’t enough.
• No Actual Knowledge Until Email Read: Red Bluff’s counsel swore he didn’t see/read the clerk’s email until March 14. There was no evidence to the contrary. The Court found this credible and drew a sharp line between receiving an email and actually being aware of its contents.
• Prior Court Misreading: The Supreme Court criticized the lower courts (and others in Texas) for treating the mere receipt of an email as “actual knowledge,” which conflates constructive with actual knowledge.
• Rule Change Note: The opinion notes the rule has since changed so that notice by email (via the state’s e-filing system) now suffices, but that change didn’t apply here.

Holding

The Supreme Court held that Red Bluff satisfied both prongs of Rule 306a(4) and was entitled to a deadline extension for post-judgment motions. The case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of Red Bluff’s motions.

Key Takeaways

• Actual knowledge is subjective and requires real awareness—not just the availability of information.
• Courts must be careful not to conflate “notice” (constructive knowledge) with actual, subjective awareness.
• Procedural compliance matters: sending notice by email didn’t meet the rule’s mail requirement at the time.
• The opinion clarifies and corrects a common misreading of Texas post-judgment procedural rules, setting precedent for similar future disputes.

Girards Law Firm specializes in cases involving Severe Injury or Wrongful Death in Texas, Arkansas or Oklahoma.

The Facts

• Off-duty Dallas Police Officer Chad Seward, working as a security guard at Home Depot (via Point 2 Point Global Security), responded to a suspected shoplifting incident.
• The suspect, Armando Juarez, was detained based on information from a Home Depot employee. During the process, officers failed to fully search or restrain Juarez.
• When backup officers Santander and Almeida arrived, Juarez produced a gun, killing Officer Santander, wounding Almeida, and injuring a Home Depot employee. Juarez was later convicted.

The Lawsuit

• Santander’s family and Almeida sued Seward, Home Depot, and Point 2 Point for wrongful death and personal injury, arguing they failed to properly search, restrain, and supervise Juarez, and failed to warn the responding officers of the risks.
• Seward sought dismissal under the Texas Tort Claims Act, claiming he acted within his official capacity as a police officer.
• Home Depot and Point 2 Point sought summary judgment, arguing they owed limited duties to the officers under the "public-safety officer’s rule" (sometimes called the “firefighter’s rule”).

Main Legal Issues

1. Was Seward acting within the scope of his employment as a police officer, making him immune from individual civil liability?
2. Should Texas formally adopt the public-safety officer’s rule, limiting lawsuits by officers injured in the line of duty due to the very risks that brought them to the scene?

The Court’s Holdings

1. Scope of Employment (Tort Claims Act)

• The Court said yes: Seward was acting as a police officer, even off-duty, because he was responding to a suspected crime, which by statute and police policy he was required to do.
• The Court found reasonable suspicion for theft, and that responding to it—even if initiated by the private employer—was still a police function.
• Therefore, under the Texas Tort Claims Act, only the governmental unit (the City) can be sued for Seward’s work-related conduct—not Seward himself, nor his security employer.

2. Public-Safety Officer’s Rule

• The Court adopted the rule, holding that property owners and others generally do not owe a duty of ordinary care to police officers (or other public-safety officers) for injuries caused by the very hazards the officers are called to deal with.
• The rationale is public policy: Society wants citizens to call for help without fear of being sued, and officers are trained and compensated (through things like workers’ comp) to face these risks.
• There are exceptions: The rule does not shield grossly negligent, willful, or wanton conduct, nor does it apply to dangers unrelated to the reason for the officer’s presence, or to injuries caused by actions after the officer arrives (e.g., failing to warn of a hidden danger).

3. Application to This Case

• The Court held that Home Depot, Painter, and Point 2 Point were not liable to the officers under ordinary negligence theories. The risk that Juarez might have a concealed weapon was precisely the professional hazard officers are trained for.
• Home Depot’s “no touch” policy (not searching or restraining suspects) did not create a special duty to the responding officers.
• There was no evidence that Home Depot or its employees actually knew Juarez was armed, nor did they make any misrepresentations about the risk.

Key Takeaways

• For police and fire cases in Texas, the “public-safety officer’s rule” now limits lawsuits by officers against those whose ordinary negligence caused the emergency.
• Off-duty police officers working security are still acting in their official capacity when responding to crimes, and get governmental immunity protections.
• Employers and property owners have a limited duty: They must warn officers of hidden dangers if they actually know about them and have an opportunity to warn. But they are not generally liable for failing to prevent the risks that are inherent in police work.

Why It Matters

This case is a major precedent for Texas law, clarifying that:

• Off-duty officers in uniform have official immunity when acting as police, not as private security.
• Businesses and their employees are protected against most civil suits by police officers for injuries encountered in the line of duty, so long as their conduct is not grossly negligent and they don’t hide known dangers.
• The court’s analysis puts Texas in line with most other states.